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The subprime mortgage crisis has brought attention to the business model, (namely the 
originate to distribute (OTD) model), that a vast majority of banks have adopted. In the OTD 
model the originator of a loan sells it to third parties through a securitisation process. The 
OTD model can be an efficient risk sharing tool for financial institutions to diversify their 
portfolio. However, the conflict of interest between different parties and potential incentive 
problem has eroded the original intention of the model. Furthermore, the financial contagion 
effect evolving from the OTD model of lending, contributes towards a significant proportion 
of the credit crisis in 2008. Because of data limitation we choose to examine the OTD 
business model of Lloyds Banks and Northern Rock. We adopt Purnanandam’s (2008) 
approach using the difference-to-difference method to analyse the participation of UK OTD 
mortgage market pre-subprime crisis and post-subprime crisis periods. We show the 
difference of two UK commercial banks’ participation in mortgage market prior to the credit 
crisis and post-disruption period. We find that the ability of the transfer of credit risk 
through the OTD model encouraged the origination of inferior quality loans by the banks. 
We also find that the OTD model affects banks’ attitude towards risk from risk aversion to 
risk taking investment behaviour. We conclude that the OTD model is a positive financial 
innovation. However the screening incentive needs to be revised and monitored. 
 
Keywords: Originate- to-Distribute, subprime crisis, incentive problem 
1. Introduction  
The resilience of UK financial system has been severely challenged in 2008. The 
collapse of US subprime mortgage market has sent a shock wave into the global 
financial system. The severity of this financial crisis is substantial. Reputable 
financial institutions have been bankrupted (Lehman Brother), nationalised 
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(Northern Rock) or acquired (Merrill Lynch) by others. Fund managers were forced 
to liquidate their position to meet the clients’ demand as investors tried to rush out of 
the capital market. Public criticisms and academic debates are focused on the 
greediness of banks. However, the question reminds unanswered as how can a 
collapse of single domestic market leads to a global financial chaos. Ashcraft - 
Schuermann (2008) provide an overview of subprime mortgage securitisation 
process and several key informational frictions that arise. 
Financial innovation enables financial institutions to shift its investment 
behaviour from originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute (OTD), where the 
originator of a loan sells it to various third parties. In the past, banks receive funds 
from depositors and make loans to borrowers. The function of intermediary based on 
different liquidity preferences allows the flow of funds smoothly within the banking 
system. However, in recent years, because of the ability of transferring credit risk 
through the originate-to-distribute business model, banks are encouraged to originate 
excessive loans without appropriate monitoring and screening process. Purnanandam 
(2008) found that lack of screening incentive created by the separation of origination 
from the ultimate bearer of the default risk has been one of the major contributing 
factors to the US subprime mortgage crisis. However, the originate-to-distribute 
model of lending has its own strength. Diversification of banks’ portfolio through 
originate-to-distribute model allows banks to reach optimal risk-sharing and 
therefore enhance the resilience to possible financial shock and reduce regulatory 
capital requirement by moving its positions to off-balance sheet. It is however, the 
incentive structure of the originate-to-distribute model causes irresponsible 
investment behaviour.   
Banks possess an unique function in the economy, they acts as an 
intermediary upon various liquidity preferences. Banks are able to assess borrowers’ 
credibility shall they require a loan. It is banks’ responsibility to conduct appropriate 
due diligence before approval any loans. It is also a standard procedure in terms of 
risk assessment for banks to perform screening and monitoring functions. However, 
sometimes they might not fully use these functions. With the application of 
Originate-to-Distribute business model, financial institutions are able to transfer 
credit risk to third parties while maintaining their profits. The incentive of 
performing due diligence and other risk assessments has been reduced significantly. 
The quality of mortgage originated by the financial institutions who widely adopt 
OTD model deteriorated as screening function is poorly performed. 
This business model works well from 2001 to 2006 as the market was 
enjoying an explosive growth. Assets value rose significantly, in particular the 
property price has gone up dramatically since then. Mortgagors were able to roll 
over the loan based on the appreciation of their property value. However, the sign of 
market reversal first appears in the end of 2005 as loan quality had been worsening 
for five years in a row at that point. (Demyanyk - Van Hemert 2008) the cost of 
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excessive lending is severe as the world economy is suffering the worst economy 
downturn since the Great Depression. It is clear that banks were unable to 
understand the true risks of these loans that they originated. The flowchart provided 
below is a simplified OTD model and there are a number of conflicts involved in 
different stage. Subprime lenders are willing to provide mortgage to subprime 
borrowers as they can generate fee without bearing the risk of default through the 
OTD business model. Investment bank securities subprime mortgage and sell it to 
pension fund and asset management. Arguably, if the credit rating agencies 
performed its function correctly, the severity of this financial crisis might not be as 
damaging as it is now. It is difficult to assess the risk of a structured product due to 
its complexity and lack of information, that is why investors and fund managers are 
heavily reply on credit rating agencies, unfortunately, because of the nature of its fee 
structure, the credit rating agencies were unable to provide independent credit 
assessment as they are being paid by investment banks who securities subprime 
mortgages.  
 While the OTD model being on the centre of debate, this financial 
innovation delivered numerous benefits to the financial system. This paper will 
focus on its incentive structure and the participation of OTD market within UK 
financial system. The paper is structured as follows: chapter 2 presents an overview 
of OTD model, in particular, the conflict of interest between different parties. It 
must be noted that the availability of data are lower in UK compare to US.  Chapter 
3 describes the data and summary statistics. In chapter 4 we present the empirical 
evidence for the participation of OTD market and chapter 5 conclude the paper.  
2. Overview of the OTD model 
Financial innovation evolves in response to capital constraint. Over the last decade, 
bank credit has shifted from traditional originate to hold to originate to distribute 
business model, where banks originate loans and sell it to third parties through 
securitisation process. There are six major players in the model and each of them 
possesses different key role. They are borrowers, originators, arrangers, distributors, 
investors and credit rating agencies. The relationship between each party is 
illustrated in figure 1 below. First thing to note from the chart was that the model is 
a bottom-up approach, start from borrowers and move up to investors. Each party is 
only interest in its next party. This next nearest phenomenon creates potential 
incentive problem which prohibit each party from performing its origin screening 
and due diligence functions.    




2.1. Conflict of interest between Borrowers & Originators 
 
Banks are able to act as financial intermediary base on individual’s different 
liquidity preference. Borrowers are people who needs mortgage to finance their 
home purchase or refinance their existing mortgage. Borrowers might not be 
financially sophisticated. They might not be able to act for their best interest because 
of lack of financial knowledge. If mortgage originators do not provide appropriate 
financial advisory, borrowers might have a financial product which is not suitable 
for their financial situation.  
Borrowers’ credit history will normally be assessed by mortgage originators 
to determine whether the mortgage should be approved. However, In the case of the 
subprime mortgage crisis, borrowers’ credit history has not been fully assessed 
because mortgage originators were able to sell their pool of mortgage funds to third 
party. The incentive for screening procedure on mortgages quality has been 
significantly reduced because of this credit risk transition. 
 
2.2. Conflict of interest between Originators & Arrangers 
 
Arrangers are usually investment banks or large commercial banks with investment 
or asset management division. Arrangers are in the centre of the securitisation 
process. When arrangers buy pool of mortgage loans from originators, the first 
responsibility is to perform due diligence on originators. This includes review on 
financial statement of originators and underwriting guidelines. However, arrangers 
might not fully perform its screening function as they are able to pass it to its next 
party. Moreover, as originators have superior information on the quality of the 
mortgages over arrangers, it is difficult for arrangers to fully assess and understand 
the true risks behind the pool of mortgage loans. 
 Arrangers then repackage pool of mortgage loans into different debt 
securities such as collateral debt obligation (CDO). Arrangers assign risk and return 
accordingly to each CDO and obtain credit rating from the rating agencies for a fee. 
The nature of this fee structure between the rating agencies and arrangers creates 
potential conflict of interest. The credit rating agencies were unable to conduct 
independent credit assessment because they are being paid by arrangers. It is clear 
that if the credit rating agencies issue unfavourable credit report to the arrangers, the 
credit rating agencies might risking lose business. The arranger creates a 
bankruptcy-remote entity to purchase these debt securities in order to protect it from 
default risk. This special purpose vehicle (SPV) is designed to finance the purchase 
of pool of mortgage loans without putting the entire firm at risk.     
Investors here refer to institutional investors such as mutual funds, hedge 
funds, pension funds and insurance companies. Investors are heavily relying on 
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credit rating agencies’ opinions to make investment decision. This is because it is 
difficult for investors to estimate the underlying credit risk of a structured product 
due to the nature of its complexity. However, as mention above, credit rating 
agencies were unable to issue objective opinion due to the conflict of interest created 
by issuer-paid fees model. The structured finance deal contributed a significant 
proportion of rating agencies’ revenue. The information asymmetry between 
investors and the credit rating agencies has exposed investors to the risk of dishonest 
of the rating agencies.    
 There are different degrees of conflict of interest in different stage of the 
OTD model. The incentive of screening on loan quality and perform due diligence 
on originators are crucial. Moreover, disclosure of rating and downgrade criteria can 
be helpful for public to observe.   
 



















Source: own creation 
 
3. Methodology and Empirical result 
 
UK banking system is constituted by a small number of large financial 
conglomerates. The big four banks are accounted for 80% of the market share. The 
remaining 20% of market shares are accomplished by local banks and building 
societies. We use Lloyds TSB and Northern Rock for this study. We obtain data 
from the bank annual report between 2005 to 2008, this includes bank’s balance 
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sheet, income statement and off-balance sheet activities. We define 2005 to 2006 as 
pre-crisis period and 2007-2008 as post-crisis, use Purnanandam (2008)’s 
difference-in-difference methodology.   
 We extract several key information from balance sheet, income statement 
and off-balance sheet activities. We obtain information on bank’s total assets, 
mortgage loans, total deposit, demand deposit and other variable from annual report. 
We use the loan subject to securities as the measure of a bank’s involvement in the 
OTD market and loan lost provision as the measure of mortgage lost. We measure 
bank’s liquidity as the ratio of demand deposit over total deposit. This is to analyses 
bank’s attitude towards the OTD market under capital constraint.  We use available 
for sale debt securities on balance sheet to measure the result of involving in the 
OTD market. Our interest is in creating a meaning proxy measurement of the credit 
risk transfer that a bank engages in. Our hypothesis is that banks have the incentive 
to issue inferior mortgage loans because they are able to generate profit without 
bearing the credit risk of borrowers through the OTD business model. This is 
preliminary study as UK data is difficult to obtain compare to the US. 
 Our sample consists of Lloydss TSB bank and Northern Rock with available 
data in mortgage issuance activity from 2005 to 2008. We define 2005 and 2006 and 
pre crisis period and 2007 and 2008 as post crisis period.  We start our investigation 
with loan lost on banks’ balance sheet. We are interested in relating the loan lost to a 
bank’s involvement in the OTD market before the subprime mortgage crisis. We 





The dependant variable is loan lost on banks’ balance sheet from year of 
2005. preotdi  is banks’ loan subject to securitises, which measures the extend of 
bank i ‘s participation in the OTD market prior to the subprime mortgage crisis. The 
coefficient of this variable measures the average quality of loans issued by such 
banks. Dummyafter is a dummy variable that equals one for post crisis period and 
zero for pre-crisis period. This allows us to capture the severity of the subprime 
mortgage crisis and banks’ damage according to different level of the OTD market 
involvement. Available is the available for sale debt securities. This variable 
measures banks’ involvement in the OTD market.  
 The results of the OLS are provided in appendix. We regress loan lost with 
preotd, dummyaftr and available. We find preotd is negative and insignificant. This 
suggests that there is no evidence that the sample banks are heavily participate in the 
OTD market. This result matches the conclusion of European Central Bank’s 
working paper 2008 December volume which was that European banks are less 
involved in the OTD market, however, they have been seriously damaged by the 
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subprime mortgage crisis because they bought large amount of financial derivative 
originated from the US market. We find positive and significant coefficient on the 
dummyafter variable. This indicates that on average, the loan lost increased 
significantly after 2006 compare to before. This result confirms the large write-offs 
in late 2007 because of the subprime mortgage crisis.  The coefficient on available 
variable is positive and significant.  This suggests that banks with large available for 
sale debt securities have suffered from larger loan lost.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
While the public and media blamed the OTD model as the source of the subprime 
mortgage crisis, this business model helps financial institutions to achieve better risk 
sharing and managing banks’ portfolio. It is more important to introduce appropriate 
screening system within the model rather than completely give up this financial 
innovation. In this paper we focus on UK banks’ participation in the OTD market. 
We show that UK banks were not heavily involved in the OTD market.  However, 
the loan lost on banks’ balance sheet was still severe. This is because the majority of 
UK banks are in the last of the OTD model chain as investors. They invest 
significant in financial products that were originated from UK mortgage market. 
This investment behaviour and attitude towards risk might be driven by low interest 
rate from 2001 to 2004, as well as the booming of the property market.  
 Our evidence shows that there are different degrees of conflict of interest 
within the OTD model, which confirms the public criticism that information 
asymmetry and lack of screening incentive have been a significant contribution to 
the subprime mortgage crisis. Each party in the model does not have the incentive to 
perform its original screening and auditing function. This is one of the main direct 
causes of the subprime mortgage crisis.  
 Our findings have important implication for UK financial market and 
regulators.  We show that as the majority of UK financial institutions are the 
investor in the OTD business model, their investment activity is crucial.  The risk 
exposure to cross boarder countries, in particular, the US market is very much 
concentrated. These finding can help financial institutions to review the 
diversification of their portfolio. From the regulator’s perspective, enhancing 
transparency in trading activity and certain degree of public disclosure could 
improve the OTD mode. 
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